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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§78-2a-3(2)(d) (1937).
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a final circuit court
judgment, convicting the defendant/appellant, David A.
Bean (hereinafter referred to as Mr. Bean) of driving
under the influence of alcohol, open container in a
vehicle while driving, and false information to a law
enforcement officer.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Is a person, sitting behind the steering wheel and
attempting to start an inoperable car, parked off the
roadway, in actual physical control of the vehicle within
the meaning of Sandy City Ordinance Art. 6-119 (41-6-44)
when another person was in control of the vehicle when it
came to rest.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final circuit court
judgment, convicting Mr. Bean of driving under the
influence of alcohol, open container in a vehicle while
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driving, and giving false information to a law enforcement
officer.

This case was tried before Judge Robin W. Reese

in the Third Circuit Court, State of Utah, Salt Lake
County, Sendy Department,,

The guilty verdict was entered

by way of Memorandum Decision on the 9th day of June,
1988, and the Notice of Appeal was filed on the 30th day
of July, 1988. A formal Judgment and Sentence was signed
by the Court subsequently on August 12, 1988.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the evening of November 2, 1985, the defendant,
(hereinafter referred to as "Bean") and his brother,
Michael, went to a tavern in Sandy, Utah, in Bean's wife's
car,

They drank beer until it was late.

(T at 35). Both

Bean and Michael testified that when they left the tavern,
Micheal was in better condition to drive than Bean, so
Michael drove the vehicle from the tavern toward his home.
(T at 35, 36, 40, & 43).

As Michael was driving up 8600

South Street, the engine of the car stalled and Michael
coasted the vehicle off the roadway.

(T at 36). After

trying unsuccessfully to restart the car, Michael left the
keys in the car and began walking back down 8600 South
Street toward a friend's house where he attempted to call
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for assistance,

(T at 36, 37, & 43).

While on patrol at about midnight, Officer Cravens
observed the Bean vehicle on the shoulder of the road.
(T at 4 - 6).

Officer Cravens approached from the rear

and saw Bean alone in the car behind the wheel in the driver's
seat.

(T at 6 - 7 & 28).

The Officer observed that the

keys to the vehicle were in the ignition and that Bean was
trying to start the engine as he approached.

(T at 7).

Officer Cravens asked Bean why he was there.

Bean

answered that he was having car trouble and told the
officer to "smell the carta"

(T at 9 - 10).

Field sobriety tests were conducted at the scene and
based upon the results, the Officer concluded that Bean
was under the influence of alcohol and arrested him.
at 14 & 21).

(T

Officer Cravens recalls that Michael

approached and conversed with him as he was placing Bean
in the police car.

The officer does not remember the

substance of the conversation.

(T at 30, 31 & 33).

Michael testified that after observing the lights of the
stopped police car, he approached the Officers and, upon
learning that they were arresting Bean, told them that he had
been driving the car, not Bean.
-3-

(T at 37). The vehicle

was impounded and Bean subsequently submitted to an
intoxilyzer test, which resulted in a reading of .23.
at 37 - 38; Prosecution Exhibits #2 & #3). When

(T

Bean and

Michael later went to pick up the vehicle at the impound
lot, they were unable to get it started until they put
gasoline in the gas tank.

(T at 38 - 39).

Based upon the evidence, the Court concluded that
"accepting as true the defendant's claim that his
brother drove the vehicle to the place where the officer
first observed it", the defendant was nevertheless in
actual physical control of the vehicle within the meaning
of the statute.

(Memorandum Decision, Page 2)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

"Actual physical control" requires more than the mere
presence of an intoxicated person in a vehicle.

At a very

minimum, there should be evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt that the person arrested either operated the vehicle
or was capable of operating the vehicle.
The concept of control is that the controller is
capable of making the object under control respond to
commands.

In this case, the evidence shows that this was

not the case with Bean.

He did not drive the vehicle to
-4-

the place where the police found him and was not capable
of moving the car from the position it was in, because it
was out of gas. Under the circumstances, he was not in
"actual physical control" of the vehicle.
ARGUMENT
I. MR. BEAN WAS NOT IN "ACTUAL PHYSICAL
CONTROL" OF THE VEHICLE.
The issue before this Court involves the question of
what constitutes actual physical control for the purposes
of Sandy City Ordinance Art. 6-119(1).

In Garcia v.

Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651 (Utah 1982), a case similar to
this case, the Utah Supreme Court had occasion to discuss
in some detail the meaning of "actual physical control".
In Garcia, plaintiff was appealing the revocation of his
driver license for refusing to submit to chemical tests of
his blood and breath.

Plaintiff had been found by police

at an apartment complex in his vehicle attempting to start
it.

However, a witness had positioned his own car behind

plaintiff's car to keep plaintiff from backing out of the

Sandy City Ordinance Art. 6-119(1) is the same as
U.C.A. §41-6-44(1)
-5-

stall.

Plaintiff's forward progression was barred by a

fence.

Plaintiff claimed he was not in "actual physical

control" of the vehicle where it was not started and could
not be moved more chan a few feet.
The court held that plaintiff s conduct put plaintiff
in control of the vehicle.

_ld. at 654, 655.

In so

holding, the court found that the purpose of the "actual
physical control" language was to place in the DUI statute
two offenses:

1) operating a vehicle under the influence

of alcohol, and 2) being in control of the vehicle.
at 653.

Id.

The court found that the policy behind the latter

of these offenses was that persons sitting behind the
wheel of a vehicle pose a threat to the public.
654.

_Id. at

The court quoted with approval from City of

Cincinnati v. Kelley, 351 N.E,2d 85,87 (Ohio 1976):
The clear purpose of the
control aspect of the instant
ordinance is to deter persons from
being found under circumstances in
which they can directly commence
operating a vehicle while they are
under the influence of alcohol. . .
The term "actual physical control,"
as employed in the subject ordinance,
requires that a person be in the
driver's seat of a vehicle, behind the
steering wheel, in possession of the
ignition key, and in such condition
-6-

that he is physically capable of
starting the engine and causing the
vehicle to move.
Garcia, supra at 654.
In Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778 (Utah 1986),
the court further explained the type of conduct that the
"actual physical control" language is aimed at.

In Lopez,

the plaintiff was appealing the revocation of his license
for failure to consent to take a breath test.

Plaintiff

was found sitting in the driver's seat, slumped over the
steering wheel.

The vehicle was pulled alongside a phone

booth and tracks in the fresh snow showed that it had just
recently pulled into that position.

Plaintiff claimed

that the vehicle was inoperable and that this, along with
the fact that he was not operating the vehicle, rendered
the revocation of his license improper.

In holding

that plaintiff was in control of the vehicle, the court
quoted from State v. Smelter, 674 P.2d 690, 693 (Wash.App.
1984) :
The focus should not be narrowly
upon the mechanical condition of the
car when it comes to rest, but upon
the status of its occupant and the
nature of the authority he or she
exerted over the vehicle in arriving
at the place from which, by virtue of
its inoperability, it can no longer
-7-

move. Where, as here, circumstantial
evidence permits a legitimate
inference that the car was where it
was and was performing as it was
because of the defendant's choice, it
follows that the defendant was in
actual physical contrrl.
Lopaz, supra at 781.
The decisions of the Utah Supreme Court in Garcia and
Lopez indicate that the "actual physical control"
provisions of the DUI statute is to get at persons who,
while not operating a vehicle when arrested, either had
been or were going to operate the vehicle in which the
persons were found.

The importance of this is that while

both Garcia and Lopez upheld the revocation of the
plaintiffs1 licenses, the language of both cases indicates
that there may be circumstances where even though a person
under the influence is in the driver's seat cf a vehicle,
that person is not in "actual physical control" of the
vehicle.
For instance, the language quoted from Lopez takes
into account the circumstances by which the vehicle got to
the place where police arrested the plaintiff.

Similarly,

Garcia focused on the ability or apparent ability to
operate the vehicle.

In this case, the evidence accepted
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by the court below shows that Mr. Bean's brother drove the
vehicle to the place where Mr. Bean was arrested.
Likewise, at the time Mr. Bean was arrested, the vehicle
was incapable of operation, due to lack of fuel.
the facts, Mr. Bean's conviction serves no

Given

useful

purpose.
Mr. Bean did not operate the vehicle nor was there
anything he could have done to operate the vehicle.

This

being the case, the vehicle was not under his control.
This position is consistent with the language of both
Garcia and Lopez.
In Key v. Town of Kinsey, 424 So.2d 701 (Ala.App.
1982), the court was faced with a similar situation.

In

that case, the defendant was in a car that had run out of
gas.

His son had taken the keys and walked to get gas.

The court, in holding in favor of the defendant, noted
that the vehicle was not operable by reason of its being
out of gas and because the son had taken the keys.
703,704.

Jd. at

Key can arguably be distinguished from this case

in that Mr. Bean's brother left the keys in the car.
However, this distinction seems to be inconsequential.
Mr. Bean was no more capable of driving the car because
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the keys were in the ignition, that if they had been taken
out, because the vehicle was out of gas.
As noted by the Utah Supreme Court in Lopez, an
important factor is the nature of the control an
individual has over a vehicle.

Mr. Bean was no more than

an occupant of the vehicle under the circumstances of this
case, and any control that he had over the vehicle was not
sufficient to arise to a level of "actual physical
control", for the purpose of Sandy City Ordinance Art.
6-119.
A final point that supports the reversal of Mr.
Bean's conviction is that both Lopez and Garcia dealt with
administrative actions to revoke the plaintiffs1 licenses.
The court noted in Garcia, supra:
Actions to revoke a license under
UCA §41-6-44.10(b) are "quasi civil
and administrative" and require only
the support of a preponderance of the
evidence, while prosecutions under
criminal statutes require proof beyond
a reasonable doubt. 1^3. at 652.
In this case, burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt was not satisfied.

As was noted in Key, supra,

"...Any act of control requires an object (here, the
automobile) that is subject to that control." Id. at 704.
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The car in which Mr. Bean was sitting had not been under
his control while his brother was driving it.

Therefore,

the fact that his brother left the car to get gas should
not place Mr. Bean in control of a vehicle which was
immobile, for the purpose of Sandy City Ordinance
Art. 6-119.
In Lopez, supra, the Utah Supreme Court held that the
purpose of allowing the arrest of a person in "actual
physical control" of a vehicle, is to protect the public
and apprehend drunken drivers before they strike.
781.

J[d- a ^

However, in this case, this purpose does not present

sufficient justification to convict Mr. Bean, where under
the circumstances the car he was in was totally disabled.
CONCLUSION
The policy behind the law prohibiting a person with a
blood alcohol level of .08% or greater from being in
"actual physical control" of a vehicle is to deter drivers
from operating their vehicles while under the influence.
It may be reasonable to assume that when a car is found to
the side of the road with the keys in the ignition and
someone sitting alone in the car behind the wheel, that
the car is where it is because of the actions of that
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person.

However, where that person presents credible

evidence that would contradict the assumption, then a
valid defense is created under the language of Lopez.

Mr.

Bean has adequately contradicted such an assumption and
therefore, requests this Court reverse the decision of the
Court below and dismiss this action against him.
DATED this

£%

day of December, 1988.
RESPECTFULLY

<?yuo^

SUBMITTED

te

s)i\

DONALD E. KUNZ
COOK & WILDE, P.C.
Attorneys for Appellant
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

)
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County of Salt Lake )
Ronald E. Kunz, being duly sworn, deposes and states
that he is an attorney with the law firm of Cook & Wilde,
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Users of drugs and Intoxicants (PUIh

41-6-44
(1) (a) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in
this section for any person to operate or be in actual
physical control of a vehicle within this city if the person
has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or
greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours
after the alleged operation or physical control, or if the
person is under the influence of alcohol or any drug or the
combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which
renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle.
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating
this section is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol
or a drug is not a defense against any charge of violating
this section.
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based
upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood and
alcohol concentration in the breath shall be based upon
grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
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(3) (a) Every person who is convicted the first time
of a violation of subsection (1) is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor. But if the person has inflicted a bodily
injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated
the vehicle in a negligent manner, he is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence
is that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that
degree of care which an ordinarily reasonable and prudent
persons exercise under like or similar circumstances.
(4)
In addition to any penalties imposed under
subsection (3), the court shall, upon a first conviction,
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48
consecutive hours nor more than 240 hours, with emphasis on
serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person
to work in a community-rservice work program for not less
than 24 hours nor more than 50 hours and, in addition to the
jail sentence or the work in the community service work
program, order the person to participate in an assessment
and educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation
facility.
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction within five years
after a first conviction under this section the court shall,
in addition to any penalties imposed under subsection (3),
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240
consecutive hours nor more than 720 hours with emphasis on
serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person
to work in a community-service work program for not less
than 80 hours nor more than 240 hours and, in addition to
the jail sentence or the work in the community-service work
program, order the person to participate in an assessment
and educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation
facility. The court may, in its discretion order the person
to obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility.
(b) Upon a subsequent conviction within five
years after a second conviction under this section the court
shall, in addition to any penalties imposed under subsection
(3), impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720
nor more than 2,160 hours with emphasis on serving in the
drunk tank of the jail or require the person to work in the
community-service work program for not less than 240 nor
more than 720 hours and, in addition to the jail sentence or
word in the community-service work program, order the person
to obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility.
(c) No portion of any sentence imposed under
subsection (3) may be suspended and the convicted person is
not eligible for parole or probation until any sentence
imposed under this section has been served. Probation or
parole resulting from a conviction for a violation of this
section may not be terminated and the department may not
reinstate any license suspended or revoked as a result of
the conviction, if it is a second or subsequent conviction
6-2
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within five years, until the convicted person has furnished
evidence satisfactory to the department that all fines and
fees, including fees for restitution, and rehabilitation
costs, assessed against the person, have been paid.
(6) (a) The provisions in subsections (4) and (5)
that require a sentencing court to order a convicted person
to: participate in an assessment and educational series at a
licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility; obtain, in the
discretion of the court, treatment at an alcohol
rehabilitation facility; or obtain, mandatorily, treatment
at an alcohol rehabilitation facility; or do any combination
of those things, apply to a conviction for a violation of
section 41-6-45 UCA or section 242 of this code that
qualifies as a prior offense under subsection (7). The
court is required to render the same order regarding
education or treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation
facility, or both, in connection with a first, second, or
subsequent conviction under section 242 that qualifies as a
prior offense under subsection (7), as the court would
render in connection with applying respectively, the first,
second, or subsequent conviction requirements of subsections
119 (4) and (5).
(b) For purposes of determining whether a
conviction under section 242 which qualified as a prior
conviction under subsection (7), is a first, second, or
subsequent conviction under this subsection, a previous
conviction under either this section or section 242 is
considered a prior conviction.
(c) Any alcohol rehabilitation program and any
community-based or other education program provided for in
this section shall be approved by the department of social
services.
(7) (a) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of
guilty or no contest to a charge of a violation of section
242 the prosecution shall state for the record a factual
basis for the plea, including whether or not there had been
consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both,
by the defendant in connection with the offense. The
statement is an offer of proof of the facts which shows
whether there was consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a
combination of both, by the defendant, in connection with
the offense.
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before
accepting the plea offered under this subsection of the
consequences of a violation of section 242 as follows: If
the court accepts the defendant's plea of guilty or no
contest to a charge of violation section 242, and the
prosecutor states for the record that there was consumption
of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the
defendant in connection with the offense, the resulting
conviction is a prior offense for the purposes of subsection
(5).
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(c) The court shall notify the department of each
conviction of Section 242 which is a prior offense for the
purposes of Subsection (5).
(8) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a
person for a violation of this section when the officer has
probable cause to believe the violation has occurred,
although not in his presence, and if the officer has
probable cause to believe that the violation was committed
by the person.
(9) The department of public safety shall suspend for
a period of 90 days the operator's license of any person
convicted for the first time under subsection (1), and shall
revoke for one year the license of any person otherwise
convicted under this section, except that the department may
subtract from any suspension period the number of days for
which a license was previously suspended under section 41-2130 UCA if the previous suspension was based on the same
occurrence upon which the record of conviction is based
upon.
(10) This section 119, was enacted to be in harmony
with and in substance the same as Section 41-6-44, UCA.
Sec. 120
Standards for chemical breath analysis z.
Evidence.
41-6-44.3
(1) The commissioner of the Department of public
safety, for the State of Utah, shall establish standards for
the administration and interpretation of chemical analysis
of a person's breath, including standards of training.
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is
material to prove that a person was operating or in actual
physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol or any drug or operating with a blood or breath
alcohol content statutorily prohibited, documents offered as
memoranda or records of acts, conditions or events to prove
that the analysis was made and the instrument used was
accurate, according to standards established in subsection
(1), are admissible if:
(a) The judge finds that they were made in the
regular course of the investigation at or about the time of
the act, condition or event; and
(b) The source of information from which made and
the method and circumstances of their preparation indicate
their trustworthiness.
(c) If the judge finds that the standards
established under subsection (1) and the conditions of
subsection (2) have been met, there is a presumption that
the test results are valid and further foundation for
introduction of the evidence is unnecessary.
(3) This section 120, was enacted to be in harmony
with and in substance the same as Section 41-6-44.3, UCA.
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THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SANDY DEPARTMENT

SANDY CITY,
Plaintiff,
vs.

]>

MEMORANDUM DECISION

]
)

DAVID A. BEAN,

CASE NO. 851000520 TC

Defendant.

The above case was heard at a regularly scheduled
trial on the 3rd day of June, 1988.

FINDING OF FACT
The court finds the following to have been
established:
On November 2, 1985, the defednant, David A. Bean,
was observed by a Sandy City police officer sitting behind
the steering wheel of a motor vehicle, attempting to start
the same.

The defendant was never observed in the

passenger side of the vehicle, and when the officer
approached the vehicle, the defendant said he was having
car trouble and told the officer to "smell the carb 1 . 11
The only direct evidence on the issue of who had
driven the vehicle to the spot where the defendant was
observed trying to start it was provided by the defendant
and his brother, Michael Bean.

At trial, each testified

that Michael Bean had been driving the vehicle.

ISSUE
The issue which is the subject of this memorandum
decision is:

Was the defendant in actual physical control

of the vehicle?

CONCLUSION
Accepting as true the defendant's claim that his
brother drove the vehicle to the place where the officer
first observed it, the court finds that the defendant was
in actual physical control.
The defendant points to language in the Utah case
of Lopez v. Schwendiman, P.2d 778 (Utah, 1986) which the
defendant contends would allow a finding of actual
physical control in a case where the vehicle in question
is disabled, only if there is evidence that the vehicle is
where it is because of the actions of the defendant.

In

this case, that would mean that the court, to convict the
defendant, would have to find that he drove the vehicle to
the place where the officer observed it.
This construation of the Lopez case however does
not comport with the holding of another Utah case, Garcia
v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651 (Utah, 1982).

In that case,

the court said:...,fWe believe that the 'actual physical
control' language of Utah's implied consent statute should
be read as intending to prevent intoxicated drivers from
entering their vehicles except as passengers or passive
occupants..."

This would seem to be true even where the driver's
vehicle was inoperable.

In this case, the court finds

that the defendant was not just a passive occupant or
passenger.

The fact that the defendant did not drive the

vehicle to the place where the officer observed it is not
determinative.
THEREFORE, the court finds the defendant guilty of
the charge in count I, and counts II and III as well.
DATED this 9th day of June, 1988./^

ROBIN W. REESE
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision to Nicholas J.
Angelides at 6925 Union Park Center, Suite 490, Midvale,
Utah

84047 and delivered a true and correct copy of the

same to Van Midgley, Sandy City Attorney, at 440 East 8680
South, Sandy, Utah

84070.

DATED this 9th day of June, 1988.
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